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Physician Organizations
Assuming Risk
With health maintenance organizations (HMOs)
covering about 30 percent of all Americans and more
than 40 percent of the populace in states such as California, federal and state policymakers as well as health plan
purchasers have a growing interest in HMO performance.1 Recent reports of a projected resurgence in
medical inflation, HMO pull-outs from Medicare in
certain locales, and HMO financial losses industrywide
in l997 are raising concern.2 In California and elsewhere,
physician organizations are actually bearing much of the
financial risk for the HMO plans. How well these
physician organizations manage enrollee care and
costs—and how well their HMO contracts cover their
expenses—will strongly influence HMO industry
performance in the coming months and years.
The financial stakes can be high in HMO-provider
contracting. Negotiated rates affect the profitability of
contracted physician organizations, the amount of income
they can distribute to their physicians, and potentially
even their solvency. The rates also affect the competitiveness of the HMOs, dictating whether they can offer plan
premiums that will be attractive to purchasers. And when
providers terminate or are dropped from HMO networks,
the result can be disruptive for enrollees, requiring them
to pick new plans or new physicians.
Capitation contracting also involves HMOs delegating many managed care functions to providers. For example, capitated physician organizations usually authorize
services, subcontract with outside specialists and ancillary professionals to cover the full range of professional
services, pay claims, and collect claims data. The physician organizations generally use their own standards of
care and treatment guidelines, approved by the various
HMOs but not dictated by them, to assure consistency and
appropriateness in patient treatment. HMO delegation of
these responsibilities to providers has important implications for federal and state policies addressing patient
protections, determination of medical necessity of services, quality assurance, data management, HMO performance monitoring, disclosure of physician payment arrangements, and quality improvement.
Assumption of financial risk by physician groups is
also contributing to the ongoing re-structuring of health
care delivery systems in California and elsewhere.
Capitated physician organizations have strong incentives
to grow—to spread their risk across larger patient bases,

enhance their management capabilities, and increase
their leverage in contracting with managed care companies.3 Small physician groups that are struggling financially have compelling reasons to affiliate with bettercapitalized organizations. Examples abound of mergers
and growth among medical groups and independent practice associations (IPAs), expansion of physician-hospital
organizations, and physicians selling their practices to
physician practice management companies (PPMCs).
System consolidation is likely to continue because the
financial pressures on provider groups and HMOs and
the competitive pressures in their markets are so great.
Larger, more integrated physician organizations have the
potential to improve patient care and to lower costs, but
that outcome is not assured.
This Forum session will address HMO capitation
contracting, market dynamics affecting physician organizations in California, and policy implications of both.

CAPITATION CONTRACTING MODELS
Under capitation contracting, the provider accepts a
payment amount per member per month (PMPM) for
each assigned member in exchange for providing (or
arranging for) members to receive a prescribed set of
services as needed. The financial risk assumed by the
provider is whether or not the funds generated by PMPM
payments will be sufficient to cover service
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expenses incurred. The PMPM payments are usually
either fixed dollar amounts adjusted for the age-sex mix
of the assigned members or a percentage of the average
net premium the HMO receives from the purchasers for
assigned members.4
There are three prevalent models of capitation
contracting in California. In one model, a physician
organization receives capitation payments only for all
services of health care professionals; the HMO and
contracted physician organization usually have shared
risk for institutional services (such as those delivered by
a hospital, a nursing home, outpatient surgical facilities,
or home health). The HMO pays the PMPM amount for
professional services to the physician organization
directly and sets aside the agreed-upon PMPM amount
for institutional services in a risk pool. The HMO pays
hospitals and other facilities for the services they provide
and divides any money left in the pool with the physician
organization. If there is a shortfall in pool funds, the
physician organization and HMO share that liability as
well. This model is illustrated in Figure 1 (see page 4).
In the dual risk model, the physician organization and
a cooperating hospital organization (such as a hospital,
hospital corporation, or integrated health care system)
divide the capitation amount for all medical services for
assigned members through two capitation contracts with
the HMO. The physician organization takes the risk for
all professional services for the assigned members; the
hospital organization takes the corresponding institutional services risk in its contract. In this instance, the
hospital organization, not the HMO, subcontracts with
other facilities as needed for any institutional services
that the hospital organization does not provide. Also, the
HMO typically does not share in savings from an
institutional risk pool. Usually, the physician and
hospital organizations have a separate agreement
between them to share the risk for institutional services.
The third model is called global risk contracting,
which entails a health care provider organization taking
full risk for all professional and institutional services.
Only an organization with a special state license (known
as a limited Knox-Keene license) is permitted to assume
global risk for both professional and institutional services in California.5
Pharmacy services represent an additional category of
risk often shared between the HMOs and physician organizations. A pharmacy risk pool may be administered
much like the pool for institutional services and, in fact,
the two pools may be combined in reconciling amounts

paid and due. As inflationary pressures have mounted,
pharmacy risk distribution has grown in importance.
Depending on the pharmacy benefit design, patient mix,
and coverage of expensive new drugs, pharmacy costs
are running anywhere from 12 percent to over 20 percent
of average adjusted net premium. These costs are a contentious topic between some HMOs and provider organizations, in part because of a lack of clear understanding
between them as to how the HMOs account for drug
price rebates and lump sum payments that HMOs may
receive from pharmaceutical companies when the HMOs
include certain drugs in their formularies.
Within these contracting models, providers and managed care companies negotiate myriad permutations of
the allocation of risk and responsibility. They carefully
specify all sorts of technical details (such as capitation
adjustment factors and risk pool residual computations)
to assure that the financial arrangements will be mutually acceptable. And negotiation topics change as unforeseen financial, operational, and regulatory issues arise.
Contract negotiations are also heavily influenced by the
balance of power between the parties.

HMO DELEGATION OF MANAGED
CARE FUNCTIONS
Which capitation model is used in contracting largely
determines who takes responsibility for related managed
care functions. In all these capitation models, the physician organizations, having taken the risk for professional
services, usually manage all such care. The physician
organizations—not the HMOs—review and authorize
services, make determinations of whether requested
services are medically necessary, subcontract with ancillary providers, collect claims data, and pay their physician members and other professionals who care for their
HMO enrollees. The physician organizations determine
how to pay their physician members and subcontracted
providers. Physician compensation methods—such as
salaries, fee schedules, measures of clinical productivity
and patient satisfaction, fixed amounts per case, and
subcapitation—vary widely. The HMOs are not involved
in determining which compensation methods the physician organizations select. Likewise, when providers
assume risk for institutional services, the at-risk providers, not the HMOs, generally review and authorize inpatient stays and coordinate care for patients with complex
problems.
There are exceptions. For instance, the HMOs do not
delegate appeals of medical necessity determinations
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Figure 1
HMO Shared Risk Model: Example of Premium Allocations *
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when patients or providers contest findings that services
are not medically necessary. But, contrary to popular
notion, the HMOs have no financial incentive to deny
coverage in such appeal cases since the physician
organizations bear the liability. The same holds true
when an HMO has downloaded risk for institutional
services to a provider. The HMO then experiences no
financial consequence for its appeal findings. (This
balance may enhance patient protection. It can, however,
create tension with providers when HMOs make appeal
determinations that cost the providers money.)
Despite HMO delegation of many functions to
capitated physician organizations, interfaces between
HMOs and providers are still complicated and expensive.
They both juggle multiple and often conflicting demands
from their numerous contracting partners. Both HMOs
and providers are struggling to rationalize areas such as
data collection, provider credentialing, medical record
auditing, drug formularies, patient satisfaction surveys,
and medical necessity guidelines. Streamlining is difficult
to accomplish because of regulatory compliance issues
and because all the participating entities value their
operational independence and ability to distinguish
themselves in their highly competitive markets. What
role, if any, the government might play to support
streamlining without stifling innovation is widely debated.

IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGED CARE
LEGISLATION AND REGULATION
Because capitation contracting shifts financial risk
and functional responsibilities, and changes the incentives of the parties, it has many policy implications. The
following are illustrative.
Some policies, designed to regulate HMOs, can strain
patient-physician relationships. For example, capitated
physicians report that benefit mandates, such as length of
maternity hospital stays, create patient demands for
services that may not be needed, placing the physician at
odds with patient expectations. A similar dynamic
applies when a provider is required to give a patient
notice of his or her right to appeal a decision by the
provider to move the patient to a different level of care
(for example, from the hospital to a nursing home). Such
notices, intended to protect patients against unjustified
HMO denials of coverage, can engender patient anxiety
and distrust even when the clinicians are actually the
ones making the treatment plan decisions without HMO
involvement.

A second consideration is whether certain legislative
and regulatory policies can be meaningfully translated to
a capitation context. One example is the question of how
relevant performance measures such as HEDIS are at the
HMO plan level if the providers belong to many HMOs
and the providers control most of the processes that
affect HEDIS results. Another example would be some
state and the federal provisions requiring plans to
disclose (or avoid) certain types of incentives in compensating physicians. The regulations reflect public concern
that physicians who have financial incentives tied to
limiting service costs might withhold, delay, or deny
referrals for needed services. How effective these
disclosure provisions will be in general is not yet clear.6
In a capitation system. disclosure of how the HMO pays
the physician organization may not be relevant to the
public concern since the organization may pay its
physician members in any of a wide variety of ways.
It is also important to consider who will implement
various legislative and regulatory provisions in a capitated context. Capitated provider organizations, not the
HMOs, must implement many managed care laws and
regulations concerning patient protections, data collection, claims turn-around times, and quality monitoring
because the provider organizations generally control the
functions involved. How provider operations and costs
are affected and what HMOs must do to assure compliance and consistency across providers are important
considerations in evaluating whether likely benefits of
various provisions are worth the burdens imposed, both
on the system and, ultimately, on premium costs to the
purchasers and enrollees.

EVOLUTION OF PHYSICIAN
ORGANIZATIONS IN CALIFORNIA
In recent years, the trend among physician organizations in California has been toward consolidation into
larger-scale organizations of different types. This trend
is driven in part by managed care companies pressuring
physicians to hold down or reduce reimbursement for
their services. The HMOs have been highly successful in
this regard for two reasons. First, most physician organizations depend heavily on their HMO revenues. Secondly, the supply of physicians in many locales is
sufficient to give HMOs viable options in designing their
network constellations.
Physician organizations in California are strongly
influenced by HMOs because of high HMO penetration
and because of the dominance of a few, very large
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HMOs. About 46 percent of the state’s total population
and about 39 percent of its Medicare beneficiaries are
covered by HMOs.7 And the state is in the process of
moving millions of Medi-Cal beneficiaries under HMOs
or capitated physician organizations.8 HMOs with over
2 million enrollees in the state include Kaiser, PacifiCare, HealthNet, and CaliforniaCare.9
Over the past decade, purchasers in California have
placed enormous pressure on insurers and HMOs to hold
down their plan costs. There has been ferocious price
competition among a shrinking number of large HMOs.
The result has been unrelenting pressure on physician
organizations to maintain or reduce their negotiated
capitation rates.10
In response, physician organizations have been
expanding, merging or affiliating with larger organizations.11 This recent trend has taken on many forms,
including medical groups growing and merging, IPAs
contracting with more physicians and merging, medical
groups developing “wrap-around” IPAs to broaden their
scale and scope of services, hospital-physician organizations making practice acquisitions and developing
management service organizations to help support
affiliated IPAs, and PPMCs acquiring individual physician practices and medical groups and affiliating with
IPAs. When physicians sell their practices, they usually
continue practicing as employees or under contract with
the acquiring organization. While physicians thereby lose
some degree of independence, they hypothetically gain
access to capital and security from affiliating with more
financially robust and competitively well-positioned
organizations.
The whirlwind rise of three publicly traded PPMCs,
each with over a billion dollars in annual revenues, hit a
roadblock this summer. One of the companies, FPA
Medical Management, Inc., declared bankruptcy. The
fallout included precipitous drops in stock prices in that
sector and a scramble by HMOs and providers to
reconfigure networks affected by FPA’s demise. HMOs
apparently were able to reconfigure their networks with
remarkable speed and little disruption of patient-provider
assignments in many locales. To the extent possible, the
HMOs assigned affected enrollees to contracts with
various other physician organizations that absorbed
FPA-affiliated physicians under their purview. Repercussions from that bankruptcy continue, however. For
example, many providers reportedly have substantial
sums of money tied up in outstanding claims for services
rendered to FPA’s enrollees on a subcontracted basis.
The health care delivery system in California still

seems to be in great flux. Rumors of additonal HMO
mergers and provider system consolidations persist.
There is growing concern that excessive consolidation
among HMOs and among providers may result in
anticompetitive business practices and possible antitrust
issues, particularly in certain geographic areas. Some
industry experts question the long-term prospects of
hospital-physician organizations because of conflicts of
interest between professionals and institutions in distribution of limited capitation dollars. The fate of the large
PPMCs is also uncertain. National scale and access to
capital through public equity markets may produce
leverage and efficiencies to support continued PPMC
development and the PPMCs may be successful in
rationalizing care and promoting system efficiencies.
Alternatively, as noted in one recent analysis, “The risk
is that short-term financial imperatives will impede
necessary long-term investments.”12 Volatility in PPMC
stock prices is a major threat to their success.
Another industry trend of note is the growth of directto-consumer marketing by large provider organizations.
Since most managed care companies include most
physician organizations in their networks, competition
for HMO enrollees and other patients is occurring at the
provider level. Providers are therefore increasing their
advertising expenditures. In addition, health plan purchasers and HMOs are beginning to profile physician
organizations to help enrollees choose their primary care
physicians and help providers measure and improve their
performance.

THE FORUM SESSION
Brief presentations by the two speakers will be
followed by a round-table discussion. The primary intent
of the session is to help participants in the Forum’s
upcoming southern California site visit become familiar
with the competitive environment, contracting framework, and current issues in HMO-provider relationships
in the region. The session is open to other interested
audience members as well, space permitting.

Speakers
Larry Casalino, M.D., Ph.D., is a practicing family
physician and clinical assistant professor of medicine at
Stanford University. He was the principal investigator on
a study entitled “The Evolution of Medical Groups and
Capitation in California,” which was sponsored by the
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation and published in
September 1997. His doctoral dissertation, “Medical
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Groups and the Transition to Managed Care in California,” was based on 300 interviews with leaders of
HMOs, medical groups, and hospital systems. Dr. Casalino has studied compensation systems for physicians as
well as the impact of managed care on physician groups.
He has had articles published in the New England
Journal of Medicine, the Journal of the American
Medical Association, and Health Affairs.
Joan B. Trauner, Ph.D., is a principal in the San
Francisco office of Reden & Anders, an actuarial firm
that works extensively with HMOs and providers. She
was a founder and chief executive officer of PM Squared
Corporation, a health care analytics service recently
acquired by Reden & Anders. Dr. Trauner served for
five years (1991-1996) on the Health Advisory Committee to the California Public Employees’ Retirement
System (CalPERS). She served in l992 on the Institute
of Medicine’s Committee on Employer Health Benefits
Reform. From l979 to l986, she was a senior researcher
and faculty member at the University of California, San
Francisco, Institute for Health Policy Studies. Dr.
Trauner’s publications include an article on physician
incomes under fee-for-service versus capitation entitled“Medical Groups in California: Managing Care
under Capitation,” which appeared in the Spring l996
issue of Health Affairs.

Key Questions











How are capitation rates negotiated? How do risk
pools impact overall returns to physician organizations? What are the advantages of capitation contracting for providers?
How are physicians currently organized to practice
medicine and to contract with HMOs in California?
How dominant are the large physician organizations?
What are the common ownership structures?
What are the managed care companies doing to hold
down costs in their capitation agreements? How are
they building the allegiance of the more powerful
provider organizations?
What financial and operational issues are dominating
current negotiations between HMOs and provider
organizations? Why?
How are the physician organizations evolving? Are
there major threats to system operations in the
foreseeable future?
What federal health policy concerns are raised by the
ongoing shifts in ownership of so many large capitated physician organizations (for example, network

and product stability for beneficiaries, solvency
requirements, and antitrust issues)?



What topics or trends should federal health
policymakers consider related to HMOs and capitated physician organizations? Are federal actions
needed or desirable to improve market functioning?
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